Iraq and Afghanistan: ‘The political problem of hindsight bias’

Arnold Kling has an interesting piece on the difference between what we know now, and what, in a year or 10 years, we will think we knew now.

Kling applies the idea to several phenomena, but his points are most vividly applied to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In hindsight, most people made the right decision about Afghanistan and Iraq. That is, in hindsight, most people are in favor of invading the former and against invading the latter.

However, go back to 2001. Which country is going to pose more long-term problems for an invader -- Afghanistan or Iraq? Afghanistan, with its mountainous territory and history of rebellion against the Soviets, probably would have been viewed by many experts as posing the greatest difficulty. At the time of the invasion, many feared that it would prove disastrous, and in fact in October of 2001 the New York Times pronounced it a quagmire.

In fact, the unexpectedly low cost of invading Afghanistan may have been one of the reasons for the unexpectedly high cost of invading Iraq. The Bush Administration probably based its expectations of the latter on the outcome of the former.

For now, it is not clear what is the best strategy in Iraq. Some argue that the larger the role that Americans take in the war, the less incentive for the Iraqi government to address difficult issues. Others argue that without a major American presence, security will deteriorate and the country will sink into sectarian violence. Years from now, we may know the answer to these and other questions. And with hindsight bias, we will wonder how those who were on the wrong side of the issue could have been so blind. Meanwhile, real decisions have to be made with imperfect information.

Unpredictable events. No important war will go well. There always is an enemy trying to counter your every move. There are inevitable setbacks and humiliations. There is politics. There is religion. There are ethnic divisions and ancient animosities. There are thousands, possibly millions of people making independent and unpredictable choices, with you and against.

You can know how powerful your weapons are, but you can’t know everything about your enemy’s weapons. And ultimately, you can’t know which measures, short of annihilation, will break the will of a zealous foe fighting for an fanatical ideology.

On the side of democracy and freedom, the only really good day of a war is the day it is won. And sometimes you don’t even know which day that was.

Frank Warner